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Election Aftermath:

"Promise of Democracy" in Kenya
ations. Frank Holmquist teaches
African politics, and Michael Ford
teaches .African and AfricanAmerican politics and is Dean of
Multicultural Ajfa.irs at Hampshire College in Amherst, .MA.
Though the December 29 election did return Moi and his ruling
party to power, the political landscape was dramatically altered
during the two years leading up
to the election, and in its aftermath. RESIST board member
Fran White interviewed Ford and
Holmquist on their return about
what happened, and what can be
expected as the openingfor popular
organizing widens in the years to
come. What follows is an edited
version ofthe interview.

FRANK HOLMQUIST and
MICHAEL FORD with
FRANWHITE

This past winter, Michael
Ford and Frank Holmquist served
as part ofa U.S. observation team
that traveled to Nairobi to monitor elections that many Kenyans
and other observers hoped would
remove the authoritarian President
Daniel Arap Moi, and herald a
new opening for multiparty
democracies in Africa. The observer mission was organized by the
International Republican Institute
(IRI), that was awarded the observation contract from the U.S.
Agenry for International Development's African Regional Electoral
Assistance Fund The /RI competes
for election observation contracts
in Africa with three other organizations, the Carter Center of
Emory University, the AfricanAmerican Institute, and the
National Democratic Institute
(ND/). Both /RI and ND/ receive
funding from the National
Endowment for Democracy, which
is fonded by the U.S. government.

FORD-Asili party rally in Uhuru Parle in Nairobi
prior to the election.
Photo Betty Press/Africa Rq,ort.

The preliminary and final
reports on the election were written
by members of the observation
team. Ford and Holmquist were
chosen as observers because oftheir
knowledge of Kenyan issues and
not because oftheir political affili-

Fran White: Given that President
Moi was returned to power, what
was the significance of the election
result?
Michael Ford: It's true that President Moi and the ruling party,
KANU (The Kenya African National
Union), were returned to power. But
it's also true that Moi was returned
continued on page three
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From noon to 6:30 PM, participants in the 1993
March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights marched from the ellipse down Pennsylvanian
Avenue and onto the mall. We'll never know the real
numbers, but it was huge! Photo: Ellen Shub.
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''Promise of Democracy'' in Kenya

conJinuedfrompageone

to power with less than 40% of the
total vote cast; in parliament, there
were 188 contested seats - opposition candidates won 88 of them.
While the election didn't trigger the
kind of profound change that many
Kenyans had wished for, it was still a
significant demonstration of disaffection by many, many people in the
country. A closed political system
opened, allowing opposition parties
and real political debate.
Frank Holmquist: Only five years
ago, the world (including much of
the academic world) had grown very
comfortable with the fact that by
and large Africa was ruled by basically authoritarian regimes. The
recent rise of democracy movements
in Kenya and in other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa was quite
unexpected.

MF: The last election in Kenya in
1988 was markedly different from
this one. In that election, as in those
before, only one party was allowed to
contest, and there was only one candidate for president. In order to vote,
people had to line up in a queue
behind a poster of the candidate they
supported and be counted, obviously
eluding any pretense of a secret ballot. As one might expect, many people were intimidated into supporting
candidates favored by the president,
the government, and the party hierarchy. Even in those areas where
there was significant opposition to
particular government supported
candidates, fraudulent election
results were recorded in favor of officially favored candidates despite the
real tally.
Everyone, including the government, now agrees that the 1988 vote
was thoroughly rigged. So, the
recent vote took place in a remarkably changed context. It was a real
sea change.
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Woman voting in Kenyan election December 29th, 1992. Photo: Betty Press/Africa Rq,ort.

FW: This is thirty years after independence in Kenya. One would
think that one of the goals of
African nationalism would have
been democracy. Why has it taken
this long?

FH: Democracy was certainly one
part of the nationalist struggle for
independence in the sense that there
was the desire to return government
to the people, and for Africa to reclaim itself politically. There was
also a call for significant economic
reform. There were, in fact, great
expectations for what independence
would bring. At the same time, as is
true of most nationalist struggles,
there wasn't a great deal of debate
about the precise political structure
that would emerge after independence. In much of Africa, the transfer of power from colonial rule to
independent governments followed
a kind of codified process. There
was an election - maybe one or
two elections - in which one or
more parties contested, and a new
government came to power. The
nationalist period saw the population winning certain democratic
rights.
RESIST Newsletter

MF: During the nationalist period
the notion of equality formed a significant part of the meaning of
democracy, which meant that there
should be a more equitable distribution of resources, as well as an end
to the kind of racial discrimination
that was characteristic of the colonial period. In the recent Kenyan
election, however, "democracy"
essentially meant guaranteeing the
kind of forms and procedures that
we've come to recognize in Western
democracies, primarily as a way for
the opposition to gain access to the
state.
We were in Kenya prior to the
elections last summer, and we talked
to leading members of the most significant opposition parties and read
the party manifestos. There was very
little, if any, talk of serious redistribution of resources. It just isn't on
the current agenda. In fact, their
manifestos sounded very much like
the platforms of the ruling party; the
World Bank and other international
agencies would have found them
eminently acceptable.
With socialist and egalitarian
ideologies falling on hard times, the
contin~d on next page
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call for democracy emerged as a
protest ideology, embracing a host
of competing interests. And the
sudden political opening after years
of repression may have "selected" for
political organizations to emerge
based in the middle class and sometimes financed by people of wealth.
Background to the Election

FW: So, the ideological terrain has
shifted in Kenya as in most of
Africa?
FH: Yes, but that requires some
explanation. Kenya's political history
is one of the more fractious in Africa
in that its struggle for independence
included a major guerilla war that
occurred roughly between 1952 and
1955. Workers and peasants recognized that the colonial government
was still aligned with the European
settlers who had come at the turn of
the century, and there didn't seem to
be any way to dislodge that alliance
shon of war.
The result was an extraordinary
mobilization of the population
against the state, which also contributed, during the late colonial
and early independence years, to
class tensions that were quite overt
and upfront. When independence
was gained in 1963, those tensions
could have been expressed in a formal way through a multiple party
system of debate, struggle, and contest through the ballot box. Instead,
what happened in Kenya, as in
much of sub-Saharan Africa, was the
rise of the authoritarian state.
By the late sixties and early seven ti es in Africa, as new regimes
came into power, nationalist coalitions that had come together around
an ideology of "we are all Kenyans,
we are all Ugandans," came apart
once the common opposition was
gone.
The new (and soon "threatened") regimes began to distance
themselves from the people in variPage Four

ous ways in order to stay in power:
by holding elections irregularly; by
banning or making it difficult for
opposition panies to function; by, in
some cases, declaring an official oneparty state; by exerting formal or
informal press censorship; by making it difficult for autonomous organizations to function; by drawing
trade unions into umbrella organizations monitored by the state, and so
forth. The result was, inevitably,
increasing popular alienation, growing corruption, and a tendency
toward military coups-d'etat as the
only way to rotate leadership, in the
absence of a formal, civilian, competitive possibility.
External suppon was often critically imponant in maintaining these
authoritarian governments, as U.S.
support of extremely unpopular
regimes in Liberia, Sudan and Zaire
indicates. In the 1980s, the U.S.
granted Kenya nearly 170 million
dollars in military aid. In this context, the call for democracy is an
attempt to acquire sufficient political space to simply, in the words of a
Kenyan academic, "have a politics"
in the open and in the light of day.
In time, a politics of equity may
emerge.

FW: So, something seems to have
changed in the late 1980s, and a
democracy movement developed,
not only in Kenya but throughout
Africa - but why at this particular
moment?
FH: The rise of democracy movements can be traced to both internal
and external sources. The internal
momentum that developed in the
1980s was due in part to the pain of
declining economies in Kenya and
throughout the continent. In the
midst of the debt crisis and a variety
of credit/donor imposed economic
policies ( often termed structural
adjustment), the standard of living
of almost everybody declined, and
RESIST Newsletter

populations became more alienated
from governments.
As the Kenyan regime felt
increasingly besieged in the 1980s
by the economic crisis, and by what
it viewed as growing opposition to
the regime on an ethnic basis (primarily Kalenjin, President Moi's
group, versus the Kikuyu, predominant in the economy).., the government increasingly drew up the wagons, becoming more centralized,
undermining autonomous organizations even more, using preventative
detention laws, manipulation of the
judiciary, and even using torture.
The abuses are documented in sorry
detail in a book published by Africa
Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberries.
Meanwhile the middle class,
which had expanded since independence, was feeling the economic
pinch quite strongly. They were
increasingly unable to practice the
skills that they had trained for,
whether they were journalists, or
lawyers, or ministers, or accountants. Journalists, for example, were
harassed and sometimes jailed when
their reporting was deemed offensive, and severe editorial self-censorship was necessary to remain in publication.
Two groups emerged as central
to the organization and voice of the
democracy movement - lawyers
and the churches. Many lawyers
were called upon to defend the individuals who were detained or
imprisoned for a variety of political
activities; defending these individuals meant that lawyers themselves
were harassed, some were put in jail,
some experienced torture, so they
became increasingly drawn in as an
oppositional voice.
Church personnel spoke out
against queuing in elections and
against political detentions. As time
went on the churches came together,
to the extent that, in 1992, they
could form a united front vis-a-vis
the regime on cenain issues. UniverMay/June, 1993

sity students had long been a source MF: Two dramatic events occurred Moi said that it would be 200 years
of opposition, as well, as indicated in 1990. First, in February, a For- before a multi-party democracy
by the frequency with which the eign Minister, Robert Ouko, was could be established in Kenya. In
regime dosed down the University assassinated. By some accounts, November of 1991, the donor
in order to disperse and neutralize Ouko was beginning to question the nations that give aid to Kenya met
student and many faculty voices.
corrupt practices of certain key gov- in Paris and decided they would
At the same time, the outside ernment figures.
cease the flow of fast-dispersing aid
The U.S. ambassador, Smith (i.e. foreign exchange relief) until
world changed dramatically. The
end of the Cold War meant that to Hempstone, made quite a hard-hit- Kenya met certain economic condithe major western donors and Japan, ting speech at the Rotary Club in tions. They wanted the government,
it was no longer necessary to fight Nairobi, outlining the kind of among other things, to shrink its
the global struggle against Commu- human rights abuses that character- payroll, cut budget deficits, and prinism in each and every country of ized Kenya. He essentially called for vatize some of its government-conAfrica. The end of the Cold War
•
essentially allowed some breathing
The lack ofan organized left in Kenya
room in the sense that the embassies
made the donors and the West for more willing to go
could focus on economic issues. The
along with, encourage, even cheer for elections, because there
view emerged in some academic and
diplomatic circles that since authori- would not be a diplomatic "loss, " nor would a regime be likely
tarian states had presided over ecoto emerge that would challenge the structural
nomic decline, democratic practices
adjustment policies ofthe West.
could do no worse and might well
•
improve state management of the
economies.
Kenya to inaugurate a multi-party trolled agencies. In addition, they
The end of. the Cold War also democratic state.
put political conditions on the delivopened up some space for human
As the year went on, a group ery of aid, requiring civil rights
rights organizations in the West formed that was led, in part, by abuses to cease, and the opening of
(including some voices in the U.S. some of the old politicians from the political system.
Congress) to express their concerns KANU that had become disaffected.
Within a month following the
They
were
joined
by
some
younger
about the substantial amounts of
Paris meeting, the Kenyan constitumoney the U.S. gave each year to a politicians and professionals, and tion was changed so that a multiparregime that seemed to be very hos- they established the Forum for the ty structure could exist legally.
tile to basic civil rights. Africa Restoration of Democracy (FORD).
Watch, for example, emerged as a The leader that emerged, Oginga FW: Women activists were imporvery strong voice, able to get infor- Odinga, was a figure long associated tant in increasing the pressure for
mation about human rights viola- with popular·oppositional politics in change, weren't they? I know they
tions to people in Congress and the Kenya. The group attempted to reg- were involved in some very dramatic
media. Eventually popular human ister as a party at that point, but was and symbolic actions.
rights concerns were heard in turned down.
Shortly thereafter a leading MF: During the 1990-1992 period,
Congress which forced the Bush
administration to freeze the FY church spokesperson, Anglican there were several instances of
1990 military aid destined for Bishop Alexander Muge, who was women's groups coming to the fore.
Kenya. The whole arena regarding critical of the regime, died in suspi- Mothers of the detained political
civil rights in Africa began to cious circumstances in a road acci- prisoners mounted a demonstration
change, because suddenly these voic- dent. Also, two major opposition in downtown Nairobi. They staged
es were given greater respectability politicians were arrested and a sit-in in Uhuru Park, renaming the
than before, and they could point to detained in response to their efforts area Freedom Corner. They were
now quite visible democracy move- to get multi-party democracy insti- gassed and beaten by the police to
ments in Africa that were protesting tutionalized. These events led to a break up the protest.
sharp focusing of energies on the
One woman in particular,
human rights abuses.
By 1990, several events occurred part of many people who came Wangari Maathai, became a symbol
of resistance and opposition. Her
which would allow a dissident together in FORD.
At
one
point
in
1991,
as
the
institutional base was the Green-belt
movement within Kenya to actually
pressure was mounting, President
rise and maintain itself against Moi.
continued on next page
¼L.2, #5
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Commonwealth delegation, which
had about 40. The AFL-CI O sent 6
or 7 delegates, at the request of the
Congress of Trade Unions of Kenya.
Within a very short period of
time, and with tremendous effectiveness, organizations were put in
place for both election monitoring
and civic education designed to
teach people how to vote and participate in a democratic election. It was
truly remarkable.
A woman named Maria Nwmo,
at the University, headed up an
effort to train and tutor women to
enter the electoral arena at both the
national and local level. This eventually led to 12 or 13 women surfacing to contest for parliamentary
seats, and scores of women contesting local seats, at the civic level.

MF: Division among the opposition

was the main reason. The president
was re-elected nationwide with less
than 40% of the vote. The other
60% of the votes cast were split
among major opposition candidates.
In parliament, 88 opposition
Elections are set
candidates won, out of 188 seats. In
Once the elections were set,
20 parliamentary districts, the ruling
there were nine official parties conparty fielded the only candidate. In
testing, though only four of them
those districts, other candidates had
(the ruling party, KANU, and three
stepped down, for a number of reaopposition parties) were serious consons. Some of the opposition candidates were really ruling party people
tenders. FORD, which had become
in disguise, who got nominated and
the leading political party in opposithen stepped down to assure that the
tion, split into two sections, FORD"official" ruling party candidate
Kenya and FORD-Asili, with prewould win. In other instances, candominant Luo and Kikuyu ethnic
didates were bought off. And, in
bases respectively.
some places there was intimidation
From the time the election was
of candidates. (The president is
announced, until it was actually
held, about three weeks later than.
also allowed by the Constitution
originally scheduled, the parties FH: On election day there was a to appoint twelve members of
faced an extraordinary task: to get kind of symbiosis between Kenyan parliament.)
organized as national parties with a election monitors and the outside
leadership and an agenda, and to observers. The outside observers had FH: A number of candidates have
extend that organization down to vehicles and could get around from reported that they were not allowed
the local level. Additionally, efforts polling place to polling place, so to present papers on nomination
had to be made to ensure that the when we would pull in to particular day because they were detained by
elections were fair, particularly in polling station, we would exchange local authorities.
light of the 1988 elections, which notes with the local monitors. They
were thoroughly unfair and rigged. were far better able to spot irregular- MF: I didn't hear a lot about candiThousands of Kenyans organized to ities than the international ob- dates withdrawing as a result of
monitor the elections and establish servers. They were well trained and threats or intimidation. My guess is
practices that would make it much knew exactly what to look for. For the ruling party was shrewd enough
more difficult for the government to
•
cheat the rightful winners out of
Ifyou set up a shadow candidate who
their victories. All opposition parties
were eager to have international
steps down, it's hard to prove what happened, and
observers as well.
you can't easily be accused ofviolating someone's rights,
Regarding domestic observers,
as compared to smashing someone over the head
the goal was to have two national
to force them out ofthe election.
election monitoring unit delegates at
•
each of 10,500 polling sites. Although that target was not reached, example, they spotted party sup- to avoid this tactic, and to use other
there were probably 15,000 or so porters attempting to bribe voters, ploys which were less likely to draw
people enrolled in this effort. Addi- · or provide counterfeit voting cre- the heat of domestic and internationally each party provided official dentials to loyal henchmen.
tional complaint. If you set up a
monitors at the polling sites. There
shadow candidate who steps down,
were other Kenyan observation FW: Why didn't the opposition it's hard to prove what happened,
teams as well as a set of international win, given this effective network of and you can't easily be accused of
observers. The U.S. had the largest opposition groups and election violating someone's rights, as
international delegation with about monitoring?
compared to smashing someone over
60 of us. The next largest was the
the head to force them out of the
tree-planting movement which she
chaired. Her environmental activism
was the catalyst for her work organizing women at the local level in
Kenya.
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Sealing the ballot boxes at the end of the day, before
sending them to ballot-counting centers. Nakuru,
central Kenya. Photo: Joseph Balcer, IRI.

election.
State Terror

FH: A critical backdrop to this election was a form of state sponsored
terror that took place in early 1992.
The government termed what happened "ethnic clashes" in which
about 1,000 people were killed and
about 50,000 more were displaced
and became domestic refugees.
These outbreaks occurred primarily
in the Rift Valley, the area where the
president was strongest, and also in
areas bordering this region.
The first major investigation
into these localized events was done
by a coalition led by churches. They
reported that what occurred was
government inspired. The evidence
to support this was overwhelming.
There were instances of government
helicopters that were seen involved.
There was also an instance in which
a local state official addressed "warriors" before they went out on their
mission, and so forth. There was a
stunning lack of arrests by a govern¼L. 2, #5

ment that seemed, however, to be
very capable of finding and routing
out opposition and dissident activities. The public was supposed to
believe that this same government
was suddenly utterly unable to cope
with the "clashes."
The weapons used weren't terribly traditional. In fact, the arrows
appeared to be recently imported
from South Korea. And the actual
attacks were done in a manner that
reflected considerable training. The
initial "warriors" that went into battle against defenseless, unarmed people, had bows and arrows. These
were followed by people with guns.
And the response by the government, in terms of bringing aid to
the victims, was miniscule. Churches became the only refuge and the
only means to provide food and
shelter.
One outcome of these dashes
was that thousands of people had to
abandon their homes, and as a result
they couldn't vote. There was an
attempt to get the Election Commissioner to agree to provide mobile
voting stations at refugee centers.
Although he agreed to do this, ultimately the mobile stations were not
provided.
Even though we suspect the government was behind all this, and
most Kenyans believed it was, this
didn't mean the public was turned
directly and decidedly against the
government or the ruling party or
the president. ~t may have turned
people inward. They.became fearful.
The fact that there was an ethnic
character, however engineered, to
these clashes, meant that one
couldn't trust anybody outside one's
ethnic group. So, while you might
expect that this would have a galvanizing effect, and it did on the level
of the opposition leadership, it
didn't have that kind of unifying
effect on the people.

fW': Are you saying that some of the
fragmentation of the opposition was
RESIST Newsletter

along ethnic lines?

FH: Yes, but this is not to· say that
ethnic groups are always united.
They are not. But, ethnic strategies
and tactics were at the centerpiece of
the election on the part of both the
government and the opposition. For
example, one opposition figure said
"we would go into a meeting and all
we'd talk about was who was from
what tribe, and what the impact
would be of nominating this or that
person for this or that area." One
can't help but think that the bout of
state terror exacerbated ethnic tensions throughout society and even
among the opposition.
Ethnic politics in Kenya has
roots going back to the colonial
period. I think it's fair to say these
elections did not do anything
to ameliorate those tensions, or
bring to the fore other kinds of
issues, programs, or ideological divisions that might cut across those
ethnic differences.
Prior repression, the lack of a
compelling left economic agenda,
and an opposition led by an urban
middle class and men of wealth
meant that these concerns did not
gain widespread support, and so
ethnic differences dominated by
default. The leadership of the opposition was from a well-to-do element, a kind of professional middle
class that was not drawn to a radical
economic program.
It's also the case, though rarely
stated, that the lack of an organized
left, even a populist left, in Kenya
made the donors and the West far
more willing to go along with,
encourage, even cheer for elections,
because there would not be a diplomatic "loss," nor would a regime be
likely to emerge that would challenge the structural adjustment economic policies of the West.
fW': What can you say about how
fair the elections really were?
continued on next page
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Most of us felt that given the history
MF: Our delegation did not say that .of the regime, given the context in
the elections were not fair. There which the elections were held, our
were various levels of equivocation job was to help create an electoral
environment in which the opposiby each of the delegations.
tion could contend vigorously.
FW: To say that they were not not
Role of International Observers
fair is not to say that they were fair?
FH: There are different ways to
MF: Right. Most of the delegations understand the political role of these
didn't want to say that, because observation groups. I think the idethere was widespread abuse. It was ology of neutrality is convenient for
clear that the government had lots everyone, but it is almost impossible
and lots of money, and sometimes in the midst of this highly conthey were very open about bribing tentious environment to avoid the
voters. Clearly, there was intimida- fact that what you say will have
tion. So none of the delegations major political impact.
One of the mistakes of these
were about to give a clean bill of
observation
missions (or, as one perhealth to the elections.
But, by not coming out and say- son called us, the "democracy
ing there was fraud, one reporter police,") that swoop out of the skies
asked, aren't you lending an impri- in this almost imperial fashion, is
matur to a fraudulent election? I not realizing that the moment of
think the answer is probably no. I truth really isn't so much in judgthink the majority of Kenyans were ment of the actual elections, or even
able to cast ballots in secret for in our final reports. The missions
someone of their own choosing, themselves are perhaps best seen as
even given the bribery, a range of part of a broader political process, of
fraudulent practices, and some opening up or keeping open a politintimidation.
ical system. One can think of obserI came to believe, and had been vation teams as part of a threat to
told by Kenyans, that there would whomever might wish to close down
be significant violence if it was a system or make an egregious interthought that the government was vention that would make a modstealing the election. The violence icum of fair play impossible.
did not occur. Observers noted that
So the moment of significant
in oppositional strongholds, people influence probably comes well
were able to vote quite freely, and before the election. Advance misthe parliamentary results showed sions and interim reports, for examthat. My conclusion, then, is that ple, are very important and seem to
most Kenyans felt these were accept- get more press than the final reports.
able, if not ideal, elections.
Michael was part of an advance
Just before the elections, it was team which wrote a report a couple
clear it was not going to be a level weeks before the election that was
playing field, and we, as the U.S. probably more important than anydelegation, along with the Com- thing said after the election. That
monwealth delegation, were going was because the interim report
to issue a report saying there could described a variety of government
not be a free and fair election given practices that the observers believed
the tilt of the playing field. But the could compromise the election. The
opposition insisted that they didn't government took note of some of
want us to say that kind of thing. these and responded quite positively,
They wanted the election to go on. removing restrictions which inter-

Page Eight

RESIST Newsletter

fered with the conduct of public
meetings, for example.
The actual report following the
election was universally ignored by
the international press, and was not
given much play locally either. Part
of the reason, of course, is that
everyone wants an unambiguous
result. The sort of nuanced result we
observed is hard to digest the day
after.
We all experienced interactions
before the elections that suggested
people were glad there were outside
observers, who could respond if
things really went awry. At the same
time, they knew very well the limits
of our eyes, and our ability to sniff
out actual abuses.
MF: We were a resource, and a
mouthpiece to the outside world.
Kenyans were as aware as we were
that international aid was being held
up, and that if we ended up saying
these elections were thoroughly
rigged and not free and fair, there
was great likelihood that aid would
not be released. That was always the
"club," and we were important in
that respect.

FH: The Kenyan election monitors
came up with the same conclusion
- that yes, there were abuses, but
that the election should stand.

The Aftermath
FW: The opposition was disappointed by the election. But was the
ruling party also disappointed? I
haven't noticed any aid flooding in
to Kenya, even though that was
the regime's objective in having the
election?
MF: There's still uncertainty about
what the election meant in the eyes
of Western donors and other
observers. The newly elected KANU
government was formed with virtually no representation of the two
largest and most important ethnic

May/June, 1993

groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo.
The government therefore has the
difficult task of ruling with no links
to some of the wealthiest, best-educated and well organized ethnic categories in the country. Western
observers are aware of this instability.
And the strategy of the current Kenyan government is unclear. Donors
continue to complain that the
regime is dragging its feet on economic reforms. And privately, diplomatic sources sometimes allege that
widespread corruption continues.

PW": So what is the future of democracy in Kenya?
FH: Certainly one has to ask what
was gained, and what exactly did
people want from the election? Most
people wanted a change of regime.
Moi has been in power since 1978,
and that's a long time. People also
wanted to institute the rule of law.
As the 1980s went on, the regime
became increasingly a law unto
itself. One couldn't talk seriously
about political issues with anyone,
even your good friends, and that
kind of regime made people feel
very uneasy, so any opportunity to
change that was welcome.
There were also hopes that a
new government might be less corrupt. Some rather breathtaking corruption was going on utterly
unchecked. For example, the Auditor General would annually present
his report to parliament saying
departments were minus a certain
amount of money, only to find his
reports were simply ignored.
There was also a hope that
development could be put back on
track and there could be greater
political stability. And, finally, people wanted to regain a political
v01ce.
In the short run, development is
not going to be enhanced in any
substantial way. Political stability is
uncertain, although perhaps the
government has bought a modicum
vol 2, #5

of legitimacy for the moment. But it
is very weak in several geographic
areas. The application of the rule of
law is an open question. The election allowed an opening of the
political system, making it a bit
more difficult to dose down again.
That opening along with respect for
certain kinds of civil rights, is perhaps the major victory, and it's no
small victory. It is certainly a necessary precursor to any politics of economic reform. You have to have an
ability to form an organization and
to hold your own vis-a-vis the state.
Prior to this election, that had been
all but impossible.
Just recently, in early May, we .
learned that the Congress of Trade
Unions, ostensibly controlled by the
government, called a general strike,
demanding a 100% wage increase
and calling for the resignation of
Kenya's vice-president. This unprecedented action signals a new visibility of working class organization
in Kenya's democracy, something
not seen prior to the election.

MF: There is a new political situation which may or may not endure.
There is the possibility for holding
the government's feet to the fire and
making them be at least minimally
accountable to a broader range of
social forces. Opposition leaders can
now more vocally question a variety
of policies.
Of course the barriers to any
widening of this new political space
are formidable, because the government still holds most ·o f the cards.
But now, for the first time, the government has to learn to deal with an
oven opposition. This is not to say
that there weren't oppositional voices
before, but in the context of a one
party system, it meant that you had
to figure out a way to get to a leading politician from a particular ethnic group in a particular area, and
use the influence he had to bring
people into line. Now the dynamic is
somewhat different.
RESIST Newsletter

Whether that difference will lead
to real institutionalization of civil
rights and democracy is not at all
dear. The government has certainly
shown that it is willing to buy off
people at almost any cost. The next
year or two will show whether or not
the opposition groups will be able to
organize effectively and bridge their
differences so that they can really
contend with the government.

PW": Does it seem that ethnic dashes
will remain a tactic of the government?
MF: Probably. They certainly continued throughout 1992 and after
the elections. Government initiated
and condoned ethnic clashes can
help secure strongholds and marginalize "outsiders." The government runs the risk, though, of inciting counterattacks. The president
and his closest allies are from relatively small ethnic groups so there is
a danger of pushing this strategy too
far. The tactic also risks the gradual
breakdown of social order.

FW": What are some of the pressing
problems now that the elections are
over?
FH: In the near future, the economy
of the country will be a major concern. Kenyan currency has recently
been devalued quite radically, raising
the cost of imports and triggering
inflation. Inflation may also be a
result of money being printed by the
government to spend in partisan
ways during the election.
The real test of Kenya's democracy will be whether it can develop a
regime of sufficient legitimacy to
deal effectively with those problems.
Right now, it's unclear what will
happen. The spectre of economic
decline and social and political disintegration that took place in Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s, and is
currently taking place in Liberia,
continued on next page
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Kenyan democracy after the elec- there are others. This is very much
Chad, and Somalia next door, is a tions. Resources devoted to Africa. in keeping with the opposition
very sobering one, and Kenyans are are declining and aid budgets are agenda. At the same time Kenya's,
very much aware of it.
likely to shrink. Staff _have been cut, and indeed virtually all sub-Saharan
When we were in Kenya prior to and there was even a move in African countries, are severely hamthe elections, we heard several peo- Congress to merge the Africa com- strung by international debt. Whatple say that if the elections didn't mittee with the Latin America com- ever one's assessment of particular
occur or were not fair and the mittee. After a concerted effort by economic policies in Kenya and
regime remained in place, there the Congressional Black Caucus, the elsewhere in Africa, the fact remains
would be civil war. So many people Washington Office on Africa, and that the debt is a huge albatross
said it so many times that it was the Association of Concerned around the neck of very fragile
clear to us there was something very Africanist Scholars, and others, that economies. For most countries, sigdeep and very ominous going on. was defeated, but these are indica- n ifi cant economic progress, and
And others have said, for example, tors of a trend regarding U.S. policy indirectly the future legitimacy of
regimes, including those constituted
that some of the old guerilla fighters toward Africa.
of the 19 50s were admonishing the
democratically, will hinge in part on
young people not to take up arms FH: We should not expect too lifting the debt burden. I could
because the costs are too great. A much from democracy too soon. imagine, for example, an agreement
young army man, when asked if There are expectations that democ- that would cancel debt on condition
people were taking up arms, said, racy will quickly get rid of corrup- of adoption of specific political or
"Well, we do know that certain peo- tion, improve economic manage- economic reforms.
ple are taking 'defensive' measures." ment at the top level, and create
Of course, one person's defense is strong, popular, and cohesive gov- FH: We need to be aware of how
another's offense.
ernments. These outsized expecta- deeply people want democratic pracAnother friend of ours said, "If tions are not likely to come about tices and how pleased Kenyans were
you look in some of the Nairobi soon, although they may emerge on the day of the election. That was
hardware stores you'll notice it's very over time. The danger is that when palpable, you could feel it all over. At
hard to find two-inch pipe... ." All democratic movements are repressed the polling stations people were
of which is to say, that Kenya, seen by intransigent regimes, as hap- proud. They had been through an
as sort of the "great stable hope" in pened in Kenya, and democratic ordeal, they had done it rather well,
Eastern Africa, is not as stable as practices do not deliver some unam- and they expected to have more of
many thought.
biguous result, there may be a ten- these ordeals. That is important to
dency to say, "let's find another remember so as not to retreat to
FW: What should U.S. policy be enthusiasm; let's return to a kind of "economism," to the concentration
toward Africa as a whole, and toward 'realism' about Africa," declaring of aid and attention in fewer counKenya in the aftermath of the once again the so-called "inevitabili- tries, to a withdrawal from the stickielection?
ty" of authoritarian rule in Africa.
er aspects of supporting democratic
sentiment. Finding a new balance
MF: For us in the U.S., we must ask MF: At a minimum the U.S. should between supporting democracy on
what our government will do now. maintain a strong diplomatic voice the one hand and avoiding unpopuGiven the cessation of the Cold opposing violence in South. Africa, lar intrusion on the other, will be
War, what are U.S. interests in Angola, the Sudan, Liberia, and else- difficult, but it is something U.S.
Africa? Increasingly, with Africa's where. That voice will inevitably be foreign policy must grapple with. •
limited strategic value and weakened stronger to the extent that individueconomies, some people are answer- als and organizations in the U.S.
ing "we don't have any interest." press their representatives on these
The danger is that Africa will steadi- issues, and generally help to raise the
ly fall off the policy map.
profile of African issues at the highSome of Clinton's advisors est levels.
maintain that support for democraRegarding Kenya, I would like
cy should be a main feature of our to see the U.S. press for the removal
foreign policy in the post-Cold War of laws that have been used to
era. If that is true, the U.S. would repress the opposition - preventapresumably find ways to support tive detention laws, for example, but
Page Tm

RESIST Newsletter

May/June, 1993

continued from page twelve

health projects in Vietnam.
ARC has addressed human rights
and social issues in Thailand since its
inception, recognizing its exploitation
by the U.S. as a frondine state during
the Vietnam war, and responding to the
Thai government's repression of student
demonstrators.
During a two-day workshop last
year on democracy in Thailand, Thais
and their supporters organized a network in North America to provide
resources and information to foster the
democracy movement in Thailand.
ARC is a key coordinator for this network. One of the immediate projects of
the network was to organize a Leadership Training and Network Building
workshop for activists in recognition of
the fact that many Thai activists needed
to gain familiarity with the U.S. system.
The workshop focused on such t'opics
as: grassroots constituency building
based on the issues; multi-cultural
coalition building; press and media
work; and lobbying. The intent was
for participants to follow up from this
event with activities in their own comm unities, as well as to hold additional
leadership training projects in areas
with large Thai communities.
RESIST provided partial support
for the leadership training workshop.

~~~~~E!~SCHOL~
-an independent voice on modern and
contemporary Asia, for more than
twenty years exposing injustices and
exploring social change

-a 72-page, illustrated, readable quarterly
that welcomes unsolicited articles, reviews, interviews, translations, and photo
essays; refereed by specialists; international in editors, authors, and readers
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One year for $18
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Free index and guide to back issues;
guidelines for BCAS authors
BCAS, 3239 9th Street, BouldeJ, CO 80304-2112
U.S.A. Telephone: (303) 4-49-7439

Vol. 2, #5

promote community alliances addressing racial violence, the group recently
worked with a community group in a
predominantly white Detroit suburb to
hold a benefit showing of the film
"Malcolm X," and a follow-up program
The Michigan Coalition for
including
an interracial dialogue about
Human Rights (MCHR) is an interfaith multi-racial network of individuals Malcolm X, his life and legacy, and the
and civic, business, labor and humanimeaning of his message in the context
tarian groups working in pursuit of jus- of current work for racial justice.
The MCHR's South Africa comtice and peace, with particular interest
in racial justice issues. The organization mittee organized a 5-part film/lecture
was formed in 1980 as a response to the series this past winter entitled, A Quesrise of right wing religious groups, such ti.on of]usti.ce: Challenging Apartheid
and Racism which addressed the injusas the Moral Majority, which were
tice and violence of racism in South
openly committed to injecting biblical
Africa and the U.S. including racism in
principles into the U.S. government.
the media and the history of labor
The group is made up of people
from many communities in the Detroit union organizing among Blacks in both
countries. The series was part of the
area including African-Americans and
Stop Apartheid's Violence campaign
whites, Latinos, and Arab-Americans.
The early years ofMCHR were devoted which will culminate with Soweto Day
events in June. The Campaign includes
to developing educational programs
addressing a range of peace and justice
a number of demonstrations and
issues including: hunger, poverty, intru- remembrance events and a postcard
sion of religion into the public schools,
campaign to keep the pressure on the
welfare, lesbian and gay rights, women's South African government. RESIST's
issues, militarism, and the death penalty. recent grant was used towards printing
In 1985, MCHR began its camand copying costs of the campaign.
paign to stop the sale of the South
African Krugerrand with a demonstration outside one of the country's largest
Krugerrand sellers, and was soon able to
dissuade many Detroit-area dealers
RESIST Media Arts Forum
from offering the coin, until it was
RESIST often provides funding for
banned from importation shortly theredistribution
and promotional aspects of
after. MCHR's most recent program
media
projects
that are part of educahas been the Freedom Tour, which
tional and organizing campaigns,
enables city and suburban high school
although
we do not fund production
students to travel together to the South,
costs.
We
are considering screening
to learn about the U.S. civil rights
some
of
the
best videos and slide shows
movement. The young people have the
(maybe
even
radio shows) made by our
opportunity to meet and talk with key
grantees
in
a
few
forums in the Boston
leaders from past and present human
area.
If
your
group
has a program that
rights struggles, and develop their own
RESIST
helped
fund
that you'd like us
leadership abilities.
to
consider,
please
DON'T
SEND IT
In March, 1992, the organization
TO US YET, but drop us a note,
sponsored a 3-day Midwest Regional
describing
the project (format, length,
Conference on Abolishing Apartheid!
subject,
and
how it was used,) to
Ending Racism: The Struggk for justice
Tatiana
Schreiber,
at the office.
in South Africa and the U.S. The group's

Michigan Coalition for
Human Rights,
4800 Woodward Ave.,
Detroit, Ml 48201.

principal goal is to combat racism in
Detroit, on the state level, and in
Southern Africa. As part of its efforts to
RESIST News!.etter
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In each issue ofthe newsletter we
highlight a few recent grants made
to groups around the country. In this
issue we feature grants to groups doing
solidari-ty work in re/,arion to Africa,
Asia, and internarionally. The informa.rion in these briefreports is provided to us by the groups themselves.
For more details, pl.ease write to them
at the addresses included here.

PINTIG Cultural Group,
2426 N. Ausrin Ave.,
Chicago, IL 60639.
The 35,000 Filipinos in Chicago
and its surrounding suburbs make it
one of the largest such communities in
the country. The PINTIG ("pulse" or
"heartbeat") Cultural Group was born
in April, 1991 when a group of Filipino
artists in the Chicago area introduced
to the community contemporary social
issues in the Philippines through a cultural performance. The group stayed
together and produced several more
projects that same year, including two
benefit concerts showcasing Filipino
progressive songs and art; an art exhibit
called "Children of War," and an ''Art
for Peace" festival. In 1992, PINTIG
held several workshops and performances, increasing its membership in
the process. In the fall of 1992, the
group produced and performed a theatre piece, ''America is in the Heart,"
which had a four-week run.
PINTI G aims to serve as the

"voice" of underrepresented Filipino
community members, advocating for
their issues and struggles. At the same
time, the group hopes to develop artistic strength in the community, harnessing the creative energies of young people, and promoting cross-cultural
linkages among diverse groups of people of color in the Chicago area. The
group works to break down barriers of
ignorance, prejudice and disunity that
prevent community members from
attaining an active voice in the policies
that shape their lives.
PINTIG is made up of 80% Filipinos and Fil-Americans, 20% whites
and other people of color and has a significant number of members who are
gay and lesbian. It is currently considering a production focusing on lesbian/
gay rights. The group is part of a coalition of seven groups working to support peace-building in the Philippines,
and has worked with a number of other
groups on peace issues in the Middle
East, Korea, and elsewhere.
The latest project, entitled "Alamat" (Legend) is part of a process the
group calls "community empowerment
through historicizing." This process
aims to help the community understand and come to terms with the lack
of identity and community spirit that is
a pervasive problem for many Filipinos,
a result of being uprooted from a cultural past. Through examining the history, cultural heritage and tradition of

r------------------------------------Join the Resist Pledge Program
.
7
We'd like you to consider becoming a
Resist ·Pledge. Pledges account for over
25% of our income. By becoming a
pledge, you help guarantee Resist a
fixed and
dependable
.
. source of income
.
on wh1ch we can build our grant makmg
program. In return, we will send you a
monthly pledge letter and reminder,
along with your newsletter. We will
keep you up-to-date on the groups we
have funded, and the other work being
done at Resist. So take the plunge and
become a Resist Pledge! We count on
you, and the groups we fund count on
us.

•

Yes! I would like to become a .Resist:

struggle of the indigenous peoples of
the Philippines, this project aims to
assist people in achieving a deeper grasp
of their link to their ancestry, tracing
Filipinos' pre-colonial experience and
drawing out the relationships with present-day realities. The project involves a
series of artistic workshops on oral and
written history, music and dance, and
visual arts. RESIST provided funding
for one of these workshops.

Asia Resource Center,
P.O. Box 15275,
Washington, D. C, 20003.
The Asia Resource Center (ARC)
has provided educational resources on
the peoples and cultures of Asia for
some twenty years, identifying and providing analyses of critical issues that
transcend national boundaries, including human rights abuses, nuclear disarmament, justice for the poor, rights of
women and minorities, and the impact
of development aid. ARC publishes and
distributes books, videos, slideshows,
and newsletters, and provides speakers
on a range of topics. In addition, ARC
participates in study tours and educational programs focused on Southeast
Asia.
The group is actively involved in
coalition work in a number of areas,
such as the Campaign to Stop the
Return of the Khmer Rouge. ARC
works closely with Empower, a women's
group in Bangkok that challenges the
exploitation of prostitutes, and with
continued on page eleven

Pledge. I'd like to pledge$_ _ _ _ / 1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (monthly, bi-I

monthly, quarterly, 2x a year, yearly). I
• my p1e dge con t ra•b u t·aon 11
O Enc I ose d 1s
f$
1
O
·---I
I can't join the pledge program just I
now, but here's a contribution to sup- I
port your work. $.____
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ j
I
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I
City /State/Zip _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ :
I
Resist
I
_ ·- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ One Summer Street, Somerville, MA 02143 • (617) 623-5110 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I
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